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Monday 10 MarchTuberculosis in Cattle: DEFRA in no hurry to review Strategy(Filed 10/3/03)©Teviot Scientific Consultancy Using what has become all too common standard jargon from DEFRA, Mrs Margaret Beckett, Secretary of State at that department, said during her speech at the NFU annual conference on 18th February 2003 that
These empty words that we have all become so accustomed to - “sustainable”, “the best possible scientific basis”. What is not “sustainable” is the escalating incidence and prevalence of TB in cattle (1, 2). DEFRA make unconvincing comments that it is difficult to assess what is precisely happening with regard to TB in cattle because their statistics are upset by the interruption caused by the FMD crisis. However, any one wanting to see wood instead of trees (or indeed their twigs) would not have much difficulty in appreciating that TB is increasing and spreading in a serious manner. One does not need a degree in epidemiology to be convinced of that. Just a bit of common sense should suffice for such an obvious problem. It is not necessary to know the precise percentage increase. The fact that there is a big increase should be quite enough to get on and do something about it that is likely to be effective. Otherwise the situation is not “sustainable” in anyone’s book. What is also not “sustainable” is DEFRA’s intention, announced after the TB Forum (3) meeting on 20th February 2003 that a consultation paper will be published later in the summer, with a new strategy being in place by the end of 2003 or early 2004. Believe it or not this lackadaisical approach to a very serious disease problem in cattle is claimed by DEFRA to be compatible with its overall Animal Health and Welfare Strategy. Clearly DEFRA’s priorities are with the badgers rather than the cattle, being committed as they are to finding an agreeable solution for the badgers (who undoubtedly carry TB) and the cattle (who were previously virtually free of TB). DEFRA and focus groups could argue for years trying to find a “sustainable” solution that is “scientifically correct” (while the solution that is most likely to be effective is all too obvious - cull TB infected badgers in the area at the same time as culling tuberculin-positive cattle,[4]). Let us just refer back to what Krebs said in 1997 prior to the Independent Scientific Group on Cattle TB (ISG) being set up (5). He concluded that the sum of evidence strongly supports the view that, in Britain, badgers are a significant source of TB infection in cattle. He recognised the lack of unambiguous scientific data to support that view. The attempt to seek unambiguous scientific data has lead to the problem of TB in cattle escalating while the esoteric scientists seek the unambiguous proof they reckon they require, at massive cost to the taxpayer but very beneficial to the scientists’ funding (6). The study is now in its fifth year with no conclusions. The management of animal health, as with human health, cannot always wait for unambiguous scientific proof. In modern jargon a risk assessment has to be made - assessing the balance between using evidence that strongly supports (but not unambiguously scientifically proves) a particular programme of action, and the consequences of delaying that action until unambiguous scientific proof is obtained. Part of that risk assessment must surely be trying to figure out whether it is likely that unambiguous scientific proof will ever be obtained, given the nature of biology and the difficulties in conducting rigorous research in the “field - in this case literally in the fields, woods, farmsteads, etc., and a multitude of other variables not under the direct control of the would-be meticulous scientists. On top of that it could be predicted that focus groups may well set about disrupting the research study if they did not agree with it - as in the past there have been plenty examples of that. It should also have been predicted that restrictions on the research might well be imposed for reasons outwith the control of the scientists had an outbreak of a different type of infectious disease occurred in UK livestock - which it certainly did. Was a competent risk assessment ever carried out before this highly protracted and massively expensive research project was undertaken? The risk of failing to get the desired unambiguous scientific proof must have been very high indeed, and continues to be. Referring back to Zuckerman (4, 7), On page 27 para 87 Zuckerman rightly comments:
The reality is that TB in cattle is escalating alarmingly (1, 2) with no efficient control measures in place, and no prospect of such measures for the foreseeable future. As DEFRA takes its time to bring out a consultation paper for a new strategy at the end of 2003 or in 2004, the temporary measures are quite inadequate. ©Teviot Scientific Consultancy
References1. Just how bad is the TB problem
in UK cattle? 2. Incidents of TB in Cattle in
Scotland, 1995-2002 3. The TB Forum. Meeting held on 20 February 2003. Opening remarks by Chairman of TB Forum re: EFRA Select Committee and TB Strategy Review. (Click here to view). 4. Lord Zuckerman (1980). Badgers, Cattle and Tuberculosis. Report to the Right Honorable Peter Walker, Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London. 5. The Krebs Report (1997) and
the Independent Scientific Review Group. 6. An Epidemiological Investigation into Bovine Tuberculosis. Third Report of the Independent Scientific Group on Cattle TB. July 2001. (Download PDF). 7. Irvine, James (2003). TB in
Cattle and Badgers: Zuckerman Report (1980) Revisited.
Further Reading
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Vernon, Tina (2003). Description of Tuberculin Test for TB in Cattle.