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Foot and Mouth, here we go again:
will they never learn.
Vigilance and slaughter are not enough,
especially when DEFRA's vigilance is lax.
James Irvine
Teviot Scientific, Cultybraggan Farm, Comrie,
Perthshire
Filed 12 Sep 07
©www.land-care.org.uk
So a ban on the movement of all cattle sheep and
goats is once again in place throughout England, Scotland and Wales.
This, only a few days after crippling movement restrictions had
been lifted following the previous outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease
(FMD) which started on 3rd August .
Both outbreaks of FMD have occurred close to Pirbright,
where ironically DEFRA has its Animal Health World Reference Laboratory
for diagnosing FMD, and where Merial has a vaccine factory, equally
ironically, producing vaccines to help in the control of FMD, also
worldwide.
As the August 07 FMD outbreak occurred just a
few miles from the Pribright complex, it was pretty obvious that
the top suspect was the Pirbright complex itself.
Perhaps Professor Hugh Pennington, who always
seems to pop up on TV as soon as FMD, E.Coli 157 or any other nasty
bug is mentioned, will eat his words. He declared:
"These things happen"
Yes, but they should not. And certainly not twice
in as many months. Or is September's outbreak just a prolongation
of August's?
Facts
The FMD virus implicated in UKFMDAug07 was the
same as a highly unusual type of virus that was, or had recently,
been worked with at the Pirbright complex: namely, 01BSF 67.
Two independent inquiries into the situation at
the Pirbright complex following the August outbreak revealed a number
of significant lapses in biosecurity within the complex. Worse,
poor maintenance, which had biosecurity implications, had been identified
in an earlier official report as long ago as 2003, but the Treasury
did not provide the funding to put matters right.
DEFRA has cut funding to its own laboratories
at Pirbright, as well as other aspects of Animal Health. It has
been too involved in paying massive fines to the EU for making such
a monumental cock-up of CAP Reform in England and the consequent
delay in making payments due to farmers by the correct date through
the government's Rural Payments Agency. The Minister at the time
was a Tony Blair devotee, subsequently promoted for her incompetence
to be Foreign Secretary, and then to oblivion, along with caravan,
when Tony left. And would you believe it, Ben Bradshaw, her side-kick,
now has responsibilities for our NHS.
Even worse, DEFRA is having to put aside even
more money in anticipation for even more fines being imposed from
the EU for serious mismanagement.
On top of that, the previous Labour Prime Minister
sacrificed farming when he traded off getting the UK's share of
Rural Payments from the EU, for some other of his political ploys.
The result is that the UK has to find large amounts of money for
its Rural Development Plan out of its own budget. So it takes a
chunk of it from the Animal Health pot.
Surprise, surprise: it is not long before the
come-uppance arrives with the escape from the Pirbright complex
of the most virulent virus known to farm livestock.
What is also fact is that deer are a feature of
the Surrey landscape: indeed, within the restricted and surveillance
zones. But somehow one never heard whether the deer were tested.
Perhaps DEFRA was just too scared to ask. But of course deer could
be important transmitters of FMD, as they are highly susceptible.
Another fact is that DEFRA did not prevent the
public continuing to take access to farmland within the surveillance
zone, on the false premise that "it had been proved that walkers
do not transmit FMD". As pointed out previously on this website,
there is no scientific evidence that I am aware of that proves any
such thing. But, given the fact that biosecurity is so important,
to extrapolate such a false conclusion to a surveillance zone was
a serious lapse in common sense. DEFRA had to reverse their excessively
permissive attitude towards public access following loud and legitimate
protests from the livestock farmers in the area.
We heard plenty about the incubation period of
FMD in farm livestock. But did we hear much about how long the virus
can survive in hay or in water or in the soil? These periods, given
the appropriate conditions, can be very much longer than the incubation
period of the disease in livestock.
So it is perfectly possible for FMD virus to be
spread by foot or tyre to other parts of the country and lie there
until livestock come to graze. That could be well past the 14 days
maximum incubation period for FMD to manifest itself .Indeed, on
this basis a new outbreak of the same virus type is most likely
to happen shortly after the restrictions on the movement of farm
livestock have been lifted.
Therefore, the fact is that the most likely scenario
is that the same virus type will prove to be involved in UKFMDSep07
as in UKFMDAug07. In other words, the most probable scenario is
that this is not a new outbreak but a continuation of the same one
that started in August 07. But it could be a new outbreak, resulting
from a further escape of the same virus from the Pirbright complex.
That would put DEFRA in an extremely uncomfortable position, with
massive liabilities - not to mention complete loss of their credibility.
However, another fact is, that should the September
virus prove to be a different type from the villain of August, then
we would be in very, very big trouble. Again the most likely source
would be the Pirbright complex, because the new outbreak is only
12 miles from Pirbright.
An encouraging fact is
that the sheep suspected of having FMD in the Scottish town of Lanark
have, by the evening of 12 September been shown to be clear of the
disease.
Are there early signs that this September outbreak
is being
handled better than the one in August 07?
As this website has previously stressed (1),
along with many others, rapidity as well as accuracy in diagnosis
is central to controlling FMD. The vigilant farmer notified his
suspicion of the clinical features of FMD on Tuesday evening, it
is understood that, by lunchtime the following day, the diagnosis
had been confirmed by laboratory tests. Considering the farm is
so close to Pirbright, modern technology should manage even quicker
results. But there has been improvement.
It took a good while longer to get the results
on sheep that were suspected of having FMD in Lanark. That is because
there are no laboratory facilities for the purpose in Scotland.
Pirbright is the only place in the UK that is allowed to test for
FMD, although with modern technology it is not necessary to have
high biosecurity to do such tests. Such facilities have not been
funded, nor have they been licenced, by DEFRA.
Let's see how long it takes
to come up with the answer to the key question. Is this the same
FMD virus type as in August, or is it a different one? With modern
technology, which is known to be available in other parts of the
globe, this should not pose a great problem. With old technology
it may take rather many days.
What should have been done in August,
and what should be done now?
There could not have been a better situation
for using preventative FMD vaccination than in the early days of
the August FMD outbreak (1).
The reasons for using FMD vaccination now are
even stronger.
The aim should be to start from a circle well
outside the outbreak area and vaccinate as fast as possible towards
the centre. This tactic is nothing new, It has been recognised for
many years and has been applied successfully in countries outside
the EU.
But four things keep it from being used in the
UK, and probably elsewhere throughout the EU.
Firstly, the slow application of what science
can provide if properly applied to the problem. Rapid and accurate
diagnostic tests that can distinguish between infected and vaccinated
animals in terms of their immune response. And the availability
of rapid and accurate tests that can detect live FMD virus in livestock.
With that combination it shoud be possible to deliver an effecvtive
vaccination-to-live policy. But where is the impetus to achieve
it?
Secondly, EU rules over when export bans can be
lifted are outdated. These arise through the lack of any properly
coordinated policy of applying modern science throughout the EU,
and a sad lack of an effective integrated policy on these matter
throughout the EU.
The EU is far too slow in deliberating and reaching
a conclusion on any policies, no matter how urgent. Science does
not get a chance against perceived individual advantage on the part
of each of its 27 member states.
UK scientists have failed to get across to UK
farmers, or indeed the Government, how vaccination can be made to
work effectively. So serious is that failure, that the Government
is the biggest obstacle to applying one of the most effective tools
in disease control. The in- built delays, unnecessarily imposed
by Government, would almost guarantee its failure.
What should be done now, is
1. to call in help from the USA with their technology
if Pirbright cannot get its act together as it squabbles over patent
rights, commercial rivalry and professional egos.
2. allow farmers to vaccinate their own cattle
under veterinary supervision, provided a modern type vaccine is
available (the authorities have had over six weeks to do something
about it, or say why it cannot be done). Subsequent checks can easily
be made to see if farmers have complied. Remember, 80% compliance
would be highly effective. Surrey is an area where pet and hobby
farmers abound. They are likely to want to be first in the queque
for the vet to vaccinate.
3. Argue with the EU to open up the export market
on a regional basis following vaccination, depending on the geographical
pattern of disease control that has been achieved.
4. Insis that the Food Standards Agency gets a
bit more vocal that teating meat from vaccinated livestock presentis
absolutely no risk to the public. This should be backed by heavy
penalties on supermarkets, or other retailers, who use devices to
suggest that there is.
5. If the Pribright complex has been the primary
source, based on lax maintenance and lax biosecurity, then the Government's
own adage should apply, and which farmers have heard so very often
from the likes of the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency:
" The polluter pays".
We are just entering the new farming season when
livstock have to move from hill to market, when bulls and cows have
to be appropriately grouped if there is to be a crop of calves at
the right time next year, when the ram sales are about to happen
so that tupping can be done at the right time, etc. The bill is
likely to be enormous.
Government has been attempting to pass legislation
involving Corporate Responsibility. If a commercial company is responsible
for serious damage to others, the directors of the company may be
held responsible and face serious legal consequences. In this instance
it is the Government who are the directors. Why should they be so
different from the rest of us?
©www.land-care.org.uk
References
1. Irvine, James (2007).
FMD is clinically suspected outside the existing 10km surveillance
zone: it speaks volumes of how inept the Government's control strategy
is.
See FMD Homepage, filed 10 Aug 07, www.land-care.org.uk
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