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FMD is clinically suspected outside the
existing 10km Surveillance Zone:
it speaks volumes of how inept the
Government's control strategy is
James Irvine
Teviot Scientific, Cultybraggan Farm, Comrie,
Perthshire
Filed 10 Aug 07
©www.land-care.org.uk
There she was - Debby Reynolds, the Director General
for Animal Health and Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) for Defra and
the UK - recorded on BBC TV giving a press conference, announcing
that
"mild clinical signs of possible Foot and
Mouth Disease are being investigated in a farm outside the 10Km
Surveillance Zone".
and that
"a new Protective Zone had been set up
extending for 3Km around the farm as a precautionary measure"
She used the occasion to emphasise
"the importance of being vigilant in the
look out for clinical signs of FMD, and the importance of biosecurity"
She said that
"how the virus spread is not known"
She added, confirmed by Professor Hugh Pennington's
comment
"that the results of tests should be available
in about 24 hours. They are a bit quicker than they used to be"
Well, that just about tells the story of just
how misguided the Government's strategy for handling the FMD outbreak,
which was officially confirmed on 3rd August, has been. Apart from
obeying the absolutely clear obligation to stop livestock movements
immediately, Defra appears to have learned very little from FMD
UK2001 and all the Inquiries that followed.
The trouble is that, understandably, the EU Directives
on FMD leave much of the choice of management to individual Member
States. For all the talk, Defra has not employed what science can
provide. It is stuck in the awful mindset that characterised FMD
UK2001.
It is difficult to imagine a better opportunity
to use vaccination to control transmission and spread of this,
the most contagious of diseases.
From the start, the most probably source was
the Pirbright FMD facilities right next door, consisting of the
Institute of Animal Health Laboratory and the Merial Vaccine Production
Unit
The type of the virus was soon recognised to
be O1BSF 67, exactly the same as had been recently handled at
both facilities at Pribright.
There are believed to be stockpiles of vaccine
to this specific FMD strain held in EU Vaccine Banks: i.e. an
ideal match
It only takes 2 days to formulate and bottle
the vaccine
There seemed to be no Contingency Planning to
handle an escape of FMD virus from Pirbright in terms of the possible
use of vaccination. Indeed, in all the UK Contingency Planning that
I am aware of, the most that has been said about vaccination is:
"it will be considered it in the context
of the situation as it presents"
i.e. no forward planning at all.
The strategy adopted by Defra, and supported by
COBRA, is clearly the old fashioned one of "stamping out".
Be vigilant, look for early clinical signs, isolate until confirmation
is achieved and then slaughter. This could escalate to slaughter
on suspicion. Indeed, the Government have passed an Animal Health
and Welfare Act that effectively facilitates carrying out this policy
with full legal backing.
But what happened to the Lessons that were supposed
to have been Learned?
The Lessons that were supposed to have been Learned
include
Use the advances of science to the full
Speed in diagnosis is key
Vaccination is an important tool for preventing
transmission
Use marker vaccines and tests for live virus
to expedite return of trade both at home and abroad
Good, prompt and accurate communication with
farmers and with the public is is essential
Use a vaccinate-to-live strategy
Sadly, this has only happened to a very limited
extent.
Test results for FMD should be available within
some 3hrs or less - not 24hrs: especially when the diagnostic laboratories
are just a few miles away
It is alleged that only one protocol of a modern
type PCR machine is being used, although it is understood that plenty
are available for purchase on the international market.
There could hardly be a more ideal situation for
the use of localised barrier vaccination than the present situation,
provided it is done at the earliest possible date. The concept,
repeated by those such as Defra, and reiterated endlessly by Professor
Hugh Pennington, that it is OK to wait to see if the disease gets
out of control before considering vaccination, amounts in my view
to culpable scientific negligence. They are playing a game of Russian
roulette with stakes that are far too high. How come that we are
seemingly treated to the views of one specialist on the TV, who,
to my understanding is mainly a bacteriologist rather than a virologist.
How did the virus get out of the early Surveillance Zone?
This has not been established, and is unlikely
to be: other than the fact the public were allowed full access to
paths right next door to fields that were suspected of having FMD.
it was only after much protest by local farmers that Defra got around
to closing them.
Yet we are rightly informed that the FMD virus
can be transmitted by minute amounts on boots, clothing, horses,
hoofs etc, etc. The recommendation by the Royal Society of Edinburgh
|Inquiry that access to the countryside should be closed until the
nature of the outbreak was established was ignored. But surely no
one would have anticipated access being left open within the surveillance
zone. But there was vegetarian Environment Minister, Hilary Benn,
proudly announcing that the countryside was fully open for public
access.
What is most disappointing is that Defra is not
apparently telling the public what tests and what technology are
being used.
Not a cheep are they uttering about a vaccinate-to-live
policy, that is so central to the EC FMD Directive.
The inference is that Defra is simply not up to
scratch with what modern science can provide and which is currently
available internationally. So much for Pirbright as a "World
Renowned Reference Laboratory". But may be what the scientists
there can say, and what they cannot say, is controlled by the politicians
at Defra. To speak of line could be more than their jobs are worth.
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