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FMD simulation exercise in Scotland:
Lessons are still to learned
James Irvine
Teviot Scientific, Cultybraggan Farm, Perthshire
with additional comments from
Mary Marshall
Animal Health Policy Adviser to European Livestock
Alliance
(Filed 8th Oct 03)
www/land-care.org.uk
Dan Buglass, in his article
in The Scotsman of 4th September 2003 (1), commented
on a simulation exercise carried out by SEERAD (through its State
Veterinary Service) in relation to the emergency response to a theoretical
new case of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) being notified to the veterinary
authorities, with an emergency management structure being set up
at the department's Perth office.
The theoretical suspected case
was on a farm near Perth on the morning of Tuesday 2nd September.
Although the newspaper report did not say so, the farm was Netherton
Farm, at Blackford, Perthshire - the home of the world famous Netherton
Aberdeen Angus pedigree herd. The farm is mixed livestock and arable,
with both cattle and sheep.
Land-Care understands that
one of the reasons for this particular farm being chosen was that
more than one District Council was involved, as opposed to what
happened in the Scottish Borders in FMD 2001 when only one District
authority was involved - Dumfries and Galloway.
So as not to create panic
amidst the farming community there had been prior notice in the
press that an exercise based on a simulated FMD outbreak was planned,
The final paragraph of the
Scotsman article reads:
"The exercise ended at 5pm yesterday.
Charles Milne, head of the state veterinary service in Scotland,
said response had been positive and rapid, using lessons learned
from 2001, but blips included the airline charged with taking
virus samples south for analysis refusing to accept them and a
delay in tracking down some officials."
However, the blips referred
to by Scotland’s Chief Veterinary Officer, may be somewhat
more serious than just blips. They require explanation and assurances
that in the event of a real infection, the virus will be rapidly
identified and that the key officials, or their seconds, can be
contacted and functioning without delay. After all the public had
been previously informed that such an exercise was going to take
place in Scotland, and the exercise was held on Tuesday morning
and not at a weekend. It is also possible that the farm may have
had prior notice - otherwise how many farms could give an accurate
list of all vehicles and people who had recently visited, particularly
if rights of ways go through farm steadings (2,
3)?
The choice of Tuesday 4th
September is interesting as on other days there are at this time
of year some very large sales of sheep and cattle in the three substantial
auction markets in the area - United Auctions at Perth and two at
nearby Stirling - namely, Caledonian Mart at Milhall and United
Auctions at Kildean . They attract a great deal of business from
all over the UK, such is the standing of Scottish livestock. How
would the closing down of these markets be handled with potentially
thousands of animals in any one of them. To take another example,
how would the authorities have handled the closing down of Kelso
ram sales - the biggest ram sale in Europe - if a suspected case
had arisen in the Borders while the sale was in progress.
It would be reassuring to
the public if a fuller report was made available so that the public
and livestock farmers in particular can better understand what might
be involved and is currently planned.
Comments of Mary Marshall
On reading the press report
of the simulation FMD exercise in Scotland, Mary Marshall, Animal
Health Policy Adviser to European Livestock Alliance, commented
in an email to Land-Care as follows:
Here are some questions and comments
based on the press report:
1. If an airline, or other means of transport,
refuses to transport the samples for lab analysis, presumably
to Pirbright, this must be a good argument for making portable
PCR tests regionally available.
2. The "delay in tracking down some
officials" - what officials were these? Were they officials
that should have played a key role? Who was involved in this exercise?
Who was not involved, but should have been? Is there a contact
list of "second in command" officials? Were they involved
in the exercise?
3. "Precautionary movement restrictions
were put in place on all farms within an eight kilometre radius
of the suspect and a press officer seconded." See my comments
below on possible spread. Would it be sensible to be more precautionary
either by extending the radius of movement restrictions initially,
or implementing more up-to-date technology that can allow for
real-time management?
4. "The simulated case was confirmed
at 9am yesterday, with a senior official sent to London to brief
Defra." What is meant by "confirmed"? This report
indicates that the disease was "confirmed" on clinical
diagnosis. An index case requires laboratory confirmation.
5. "Theoretical valuation and slaughter
of the 163 cattle on the farm - burial or burning still the options
- was carried out as representatives of every stakeholder group
met in Edinburgh." Two points here:
a. There is a good case for immediate
slaughter of cattle that show clinical symptoms, but is valuation
and slaughter the priority, for which all the stakeholders need
to meet in Edinburgh on day one, while other, perhaps important,
"officials" were not "tracked down"? The efficiency
regarding valuation and slaughter consultation must be extended
to all aspects of this exercise.
b. How many of these 163 cattle showed
clinical symptoms? If the number is large, depending on the strain,
plumes of infection could be significant. Were modelling techniques
of plumes of infection used in the control measures? This could
be linked by computer, as in point 3 above, to allow for real-time
management.
6. "The state veterinary service
tracked down all vehicles and people recently on the farm as well
as other potentially infected sites using the cattle tracing system."
Two questions here:
a. What is meant by "recently"?
Was it a one-day, or (preferably) a five-day trace-back?
b. What system was used for sheep, or
were no sheep present on the "other potentially infected
sites"? How helpful is the exercise if sheep are not involved?
7. "Vaccination would be considered
if FMD spread, but that would depend on the virus strain."
Three points here:
a. "if FMD spread" - determination
of the spread must be a top priority, and justifies the wide use
of portable PCR tests linked to computer databases with geographical
and meteorological data.
b. Since knowledge of the characteristics
of the strain is essential to determine its method of spread,
and since identification of the strain requires lab analysis,
any delays in transporting the samples rapidly to the lab will
have serious consequences. What was the reason for the refusal
by the airline? What measures can be taken to ensure this would
not occur in a real case of possible infection? Note that if portable
rapid PCR tests are used, there would be more certainty about
the presence of the virus. How long does it take to identify the
virus strain once the samples have arrived in the lab for analysis?
c. Would vaccine readiness be put in
place immediately upon identification of the strain, or only after
a decision was taken based on the spread? Who would make that
decision? Would advice be taken from the permanently operational
"expert group"? When would the vaccination teams be
notified?
8. Was the permanently operational "expert
group" involved in the planning and in the exercise itself?
Did this include vets, FMD experts, meteorologists, and an independent
emergency management engineer?
Is there an official report for stakeholders
to review? Is there a full report for the Expert Group to review?
Is there a report on the simulation exercise
that took place in Wales on 30 September?
Mary Marshall
Animal Health Policy Adviser
European Livestock Alliance
7 October 2003
Land-Care echoes Mary Marshall’s
concerns. We understand that a representative from the Scottish
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) did not attend. Yet they
are essential in relation to how carcase disposal of livestock from
an affected farm can be safely carried out in terms of environmental
issues.
We also understand that it
was alleged that final confirmation of the viral strain involved
could take some 14 days - far too long for any vaccination programme
to be effective. It could be that this is a misunderstanding and
the time interval would in fact be much less. However, the fact
that such a time scale was being mentioned at all indicates the
great need for much better communication and education about how
a new outbreadk of FMD would be handled.
It would appear that the application
of long-established science to the rapid diagnosis of FMD and the
ability to distinguish between naturally infected animals and vaccinated
ones in terms of FMD has still not been applied to any future outbreak
within the UK (although it has elsewhere).
A search of the State Veterinary
Service (Scotland) website makes no reference to the exercise. Direct
inquiry to the Press Office of the Scottish Executive confirmed
that no further information other than that contained in the newspaper
article referred to above is available, but that a report will be
published on future strategy sometime in the future. Land-Care has
therefore had to rely on newspaper articles and local knowledge.
It seems that the Scottish
Executive through its State Veterinary Service has a long way to
go and not a lot of time to get there. Getting there involves meeting
the new EU Directive on FMD control that puts vaccination in the
front line of strategy (4). The inference from
what can be gleaned from the simulation exercise carried out in
Perthshire on 4th September 2003 is that we are still on the starting
line.
Essential to the EU directive
is that the virus strain can be rapidly identified and appropriate
vaccines made available, and methods for their use clearly established.
The numerous foot and mouth
inquires into FMD 2001 have all reported. The recommendation that
the Food Standards Agency should be making the public aware that
there is no danger in eating meat from FMD vaccinated animals does
not seem to be happening. The time to do this is when there is not
a crisis (5), but personal communication from with
a member of the FSA indicated that as yet the FSA has been too busy
to get round to it.
Recent discussion with a member
of the USA Center for Disease Control (CDC) highlighted the difference
in the level of biosecurity at airports in the USA and the UK in
terms of preventing the entry into the respective countries of FMD
contaminated products. The UK claims that it is too difficult and
biosecurity at points of entry to the UK remain very lax.
Let us only hope that the
UK is spared another FMD outbreak until such time as this particular
EU directive is in force. DEFRA and its Scottish equivalent should
remember that if they do not get their houses in order regarding
FMD then the EU has taken the power to do it for them.
References
1. Buglass, Dan (2003).
FMD exercise shows lessons learned. The Scotsman 4th Sept.
http://www.news.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=972872003 (Click
here to view).
2. Scottish Natural
Heritage (2003). Draft Scottish Outdoor Access Cdoe.
www.snh.org.uk
3. Irvine, James
(2003). Draft Scottish Outdoor Access Code: Response to consultation.
See SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE HOMEPAGE, Filed 28 June 03, www.land-care.org.uk,
Click
here to view
4. Editorial (2003).
New EU Directive on FMD.
See FMD HOMEPAGE, Filed Oct 03, www.land-care.org.uk, Click
here to view
5. Royal Society
of Edinburgh (2002). Foot and Mouth Inquiry.
www.royalsoced.org.uk
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