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FMD outbreak in Libya

Mary Marshall

European Livestock Alliance

(Filed 18 July 03)
www.land-care.org.uk

I would like to draw attention to the debate on 15 July 2003 in the House of Lords on the FMD outbreak in Libya (Hansard transcript is copied below). We should all be grateful to Lord Plumb and the other members of the House of Lords for asking these important questions and for seeking answers with regard to the potential threat to the UK and to other EU member countries.

May I suggest for your consideration, some points arising from this debate?

It is puzzling that Lord Whitty should begin by saying that

“We are satisfied that the existing plans and precautions are sufficient for the relatively low threat from Libya.”

Yet, on further questioning Lord Whitty admitted that

“In terms of the strain of the disease, the virus in Libya is SAT 2 which has never been recorded in North Africa previously.”

Is he aware that “SAT 2 is of concern because as a serotype it has a reputation for being highly contagious and antigenically diverse” (1)?

Since, as Lord Whitty says, this serotype “has never been recorded in North Africa”, let alone in Europe, it “may have implications in the epidemiology and clinical picture of the disease” (2).

Does this not increase the potential risk that it may arrive here and spread undetected? Lord Whitty has not adequately answered Lord Plumb’s question: “Will extra surveillance be instituted and targeted where risks are highest?”

I suggest that it is now time for an informed debate on what surveillance strategy would be most effective. The risks that widespread testing, e.g. using portable rapid diagnostic tests and testing milk at collection, could close down the UK with false positives must be set against considering that “the cost of 3-7 days national stoppage cannot be more than the cost of that number of days of free movement by viraemic animals" (3).

Reports of the situation in Libya are particularly worrying and require reassurance from Lord Whitty that effective controls in Libya and in neighbouring countries, are, indeed, in place: “The crucial question is, whether the virus -- which had penetrated into Libya (from where?) at least 8 weeks before its first reporting to the OIE, on 18 Jun 2003 -- is present also in the large populations of sheep and goats” (ProMED moderator, 5 July 2003).

“According to FAO statistics, the animal population of Libya includes 152000 bovines, 6.4 million ovines and 2.2 million caprines. Preventing the introduction of the SAT 2 virus into small ruminants, which may become subsequently virus carriers for an unpredictable period (theoretically, up to several months), will need significant efforts”

(ProMED moderator, 28 June 2003)

 

“We recognize the possibility that a different strain from the vaccine strain may circulate anywhere that FMD occurs, but in Libya, this is no longer just a possibility. In all probability, the animals in the country are not protected. Very rigorous disease and movement controls will be needed to keep ahead of this fast moving disease”

(ProMED moderator, 21 June 2003)

I would ask Lord Whitty two questions:

  • 1. Will the government seek assurance from Libya that they are being assisted by the bodies whose mandate and expertise is in emergency control (FAO/IAEA, OIE), so that we can be assured that sufficient samples are sent to the World Reference Laboratory at Pirbright for testing? In addition to the samples from cattle which have been sent to Pirbright, this should include samples from sheep and goats, because of the added difficulties in control if infection has spread to nomadic herds. What control measures does Libya have in place? Preventive vaccination?


  • 2. What surveillance and preventive measures have been taken by other countries in the region, and especially Tunisia which is directly threatened since it borders the infected zone? Have they requested these international bodies to assist them for rapid confirmation of infection?

Is Lord Whitty aware that there are currently FMD SAT outbreaks also in Malawi and Zimbabwe, and of FMD in Paraguay and Bolivia, countries which are also not so far away to zones exporting to Europe? In Paraguay, worryingly, we read of “The reported identification of a simultaneous field infection with 2 serotypes” (ProMED moderator, 15 July 2003, where it should be noted that the moderator has recommended obtaining confirmation by the reference lab).

Lord Whitty says that "we have sufficient vaccine to deal with an outbreak of this strain. Clearly, more will be produced, but that is not to say that every strain of foot and mouth disease is covered by vaccine stocks in Britain or Europe."

How can he be sure that we have sufficient vaccine? With regard to vaccine matching, "the virus is related to others for which vaccines are available. SAT2 vaccine reserves are kept but whether or not in sufficient amounts, depends on what circumstances arise" (1).

Clearly, the question of vaccine sufficiency will depend on the circumstances of the entry and the spread of the virus before detection and before movement controls are in place (and thereafter on effectiveness of such controls, e.g. biosecurity). To say now that vaccine is sufficient suggests that Defra have modelled the distribution of size of outbreaks and populations to be vaccinated. Has this been done?

I suggest that this current threat needs increased attention, and collaboration from and with all sectors.

Consider this warning:

“The situation in the Middle East and in North Africa constitutes a threat to other regions of the world, especially Europe“

H A Aidaros, the CVO of Egypt, (4)

And this reminder also from Dr Aidaros(4):

“An FMD outbreak caused by type O occurred in North Africa in February 1999. The disease was first reported in Algeria where it spread rapidly from the east to the west of the country. Isolated outbreaks of the disease also occurred in Tunisia and Morocco.”

Have we done all we can to prevent the spread of this SAT 2 outbreak?

If we haven't, are we really prepared?

Mary Marshall
Animal Health Policy Coordinator
European Livestock Alliance
16 July 2003


Referecnes

1. Personal Email from David Paton IAH at Pirbright 15th July 2003.

2. Roger, Paul 92003). Letter to Vet Record 7th July 2003.

3. Personal Email from Prof Martin Hugh-Jones. 6th Narch 2003.

4. Aidaros, H A (2002). in "Regional status and approach to control and eradication of foot and mouth disease in the Middle East and North Africa"
Rev. Sci. tech. Off. Int. Epiz.: vol 21 (3), 451-458).