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Putting the contingency plan into operation - but
with the same mistakes, yet again
Blunders are revealed in Scots bird flu scare
James Irvine
Teviot Scientific, Edinburgh and Cultybraggan
Farm, Comrie, Perthshire
Filed 28 Mar 06
©www.land-care.org.uk
I thought I should get a local paper as I travelled
north on 24th March to attend the public meeting in Mallaig, where
the Scottish Executive's plans to make a massive area of Scotland's
west coast plus a number of the Hebridean islands into a Coastal
& Marine National Park was to be discussed. The Press and Journal
(P&J), which proclaims itself to be "The Voice of the
North", is well known for the quality of its coverage
of farming, fishing and land management matters. It did not disappoint.
The front page headline read:
"Blunders are revealed in Scots bird flu
scare"
Here was a chance to see Contingency Planning
in operation in real time when there was a scare that avian flu
had arrived on a poultry farm in Orkney. According to the newspaper
report the following happened.
A box that was supposed to contain antivirals
for those who might be involved in handling the diseased birds contained
nothing other than posters and leaflets. The antivirals had somehow
gone off to Birmingham. A Scottish Executive spokesperson told the
P&J that another lot of antivirals did reach their proper destination
"within the day that was intended". But perhaps those
handling dead birds that might have H5N1 may have felt more assured
if the antivirals had been there before they started - what with
the reputation the situation has for killing people.
But then there was the problem of getting the
samples from the dead poultry off the island to the mainland, and
then to the appropriate laboratory. So the officials allegedly tried
to take them into the cabin of a scheduled Loganair flight, only
to be refused under dangerous substances legislation. So the services
of the Maritime and Coast Guard Agency had to be called upon. Just
how long it took to get the samples to the appropriate laboratory
is not disclosed.
Fortunately the preliminary results were negative
for H5N1, but there were many days of waiting - with the farm under
movement restrictions - for this to be confirmed.
The P&J went on to say that microbiologist
Professor Hugh Pennington - in characteristically refrained terms
that allow him to be an advisor to governments and to be highly
respected by the populace at the same time - commented that the
events proved Scotland's response to any potential bird flu outbreak
needed to be "sharper".
And so it should be, because the problem with
scheduled airlines as a means of transporting potential hazardous
substances was fully revealed previously. During a mock exercise
relating to an outbreak of FMD the authorities had the same problem
when they attempted to send dummy samples from Perthshire to a laboratory
in England. How many lapses does it take for lessons to be learned?
The farmer involved in the recent avian flu scare
on Orkney, John McNally of Bon Accord Farm, Sandwick, was somewhat
less diplomatic than Professor Pennington, describing the affair
as
"the biggest cock-up I have heard in my
life - somebody has obviously completely messed this up somewhere"
The Orkney scare also reveals that reliable, rapid,
on farm diagnostic tests are still not being applied. Where is the
rapid task force equipped with appropriate PCR mobile technology
that was advocated 5 years ago? Speed in making a firm diagnosis
is of the essence in handling a suspected outbreak of a highly infectious
disease of livestock.
Had an outbreak of avian flu been confirmed in
Orkney, what was going to be the authorities approach to the use
of vaccination? To date Professor Sir David King has told everyone
that the currently available vaccines are not sufficiently effective
to be used. This goes against the experience with the use of the
same vaccine in other countries, and the understanding of the equivalent
government authorities in other EU member states, such as France
and Holland. Moreover, it is understood that the UK does not have
any vaccine for use against H5N1 in farmed livestock, although it
has ordered 2.3 million doses of the self-same vaccine (Intervet
Nobilis) for zoos and the protection of rare breeds. To say the
least there does seem to be an inconsistency in the UK government's
thinking.
Yet the UK government can claim that it complies
with the EC directives on the matter. They are only required to
think about the use of vaccination when an outbreak occurs. The
UK government can say that it has thought about it and dismissed
it. In spite of the government's arguments to the converse, there
are in fact only a limited number of scenarios that cover how an
outbreak of avian flu (or other infectious disease) is likely to
occur. Some advanced and constructive thinking (i.e. better forward
planning), better use of modern technology and of course better
communication with its own staff and with others would be in order.
These, of course, were the recommendations of all the main inquiries
that followed UK FMD 2001. But has anything changed?
If vaccination is to be used, then here again
speed is of the essence. Having conferences at the start of an outbreak
as to how vaccination might be used and waiting to get vaccine is
not the best way of achieving a rapid response should one be deemed
necessary.
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